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Abstract 
Asset securitizations increase audit complexity and u it risks, which are expected to 
increase audit effort. We predict auditors became more sensitive to banks’ asset 
securitization risks in light of their role in bank failures and the financial downturn 
that commenced in 2007. Using bank holding company data from 2003 to 2009, we 
find that asset securitization risks (retained interests) are associated with bank audit 
fees during, but not before, the global financial crisis. This suggests auditors were 
previously less attentive to securitization risks before the GFC. The results are 
consistent with auditors previously treating securitizations as asset sales rather than 
recourse debt. 
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Auditors have been criticized in relation to disclosure issues concerning asset 
securitizations in the form of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt 
obligations. During the emergence of the sub-prime mortgage through 2003-2005 and 
its eruption with the downturn in the U.S. real estate market in 2006, there was 
substantial attention given to accounting issues and valuation concerns with 
securitized assets (e.g., Karaoglu 2005; Niu and Richardson 2006; Shipper and Yohn 
2007). Despite the public and political attention given to Fannie Mae in 2004 and 
related prosecutions in 2006, there was little such attention given to more generalized 
auditing risks pertaining to loan securitization at that time. Criticisms of auditors 
intensified with the 2007 surge in problems faced by firms dealing in securitized 
loans, exacerbated by the subsequent failures of banks nd other mortgage lenders 
(e.g., Richard 2008).1 It is now perceived that audit failures in relation to securitized 
assets pre-date the global financial crisis. The initial bank failures associated with the 
onset of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007 and subsequent high profile cases of 
failure or distress have since attracted accusations that the auditors: did not take 
appropriate actions in response to fraudulent misstatements regarding recourse or 
repurchase provisions and helped or allowed companies to violate GAAP (e.g., New 
Century case2; see Kardos, 2009); issued inappropriate opinions on ecuritizations and 
overall insolvency (e.g., Lehman Brothers case 2007;see Richard, 2008); and used 
inadequate audit processes (e.g., Fannie Mae scandal 2006).Washington Mutual Bank 
was the sixth largest U.S. bank in 2008 when it became the largest U.S. bank failure 
in history. It was the thirteenth bank failure that year, but its size (assets $300 billion) 
is likely to have more acutely focused subsequent attention on the credibility of banks’ 
accounting treatments of securitized assets involving low grade mortgages. It came 
shortly after the failure of Indy Mac (Independent National Mortgage Corporation; 
assets $32 billion), whose demise was also attributed to large losses from securitized 
mortgages. The perceived audit failures undermine the financial reporting credibility 
                                                
1FIDC data indicates that, after zero failures in 2005 and 2006, 3 US banks failed in 2007, Failures then increased 
rapidly, with 25 in 2008, 140 in 2009 and 157 in 2010. An additional 13 banks received FIDC assistance i  2009-
2010. Failure and assistance statistics are from the FIDC site http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/ last accessed May 26, 
2011. 
2Accusations against New Century’s auditor, KPMG, of failing to take appropriate action and aiding in breaches of 
GAAP are contained in the Complaint for Declaratory Relief; Negligence and Aiding and Abetting Breach of 
Fiduciary Duty to the Superior Court of The State of California filed by Thomas, Alexander & Forrester LLP 
(attorneys for The New Century Liquidating Trust) in March 2009. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911700
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of the reporting entities and harm domestic and global economies. 
Prior studies investigate the economic substance of asset securitization risk 
transfers (Kane 1997; Niu and Richardson 2006; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Chen et al. 
2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011), the extent of risk transfers with 
recourse (Higgins and Mason 2004; Gorton and Souleles 2006; Chen et al. 2008), 
information uncertainty regarding risk transfers (Cheng et al. 2011), and earnings and 
capital management in asset securitizations (Ambrose et al. 2005; Karaoglu 2005; 
Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009; Dechow et al.2010). However, 
despite strong awareness of asset securitization risks evidenced in this research and 
the criticisms of auditors in relation to related bank losses after 2007, there is little or 
no prior research testing the link between asset securitizations risks to originating 
banks and their auditors’ efforts. 
We suggest that the characteristics of asset securitizations and flexible 
accounting rules were particularly challenging for auditors during the onset of the 
financial crisis. The complexity of asset securitizations and management’s flexibility 
to choose whether to account for securitization as asset sales or borrowings (Kane 
1997; Shipper and Yohn 2007) make it difficult for auditors to understand the true 
economic substance of the instruments, the financial risk status of the originating 
bank, and the discretionary earnings and capital management opportunities created by 
securitization transactions (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Karaoglu 
2005). The challenges and auditors’ limitations in this regard also affect auditors’ risk 
considerations in audit planning and pricing (Houstn et al. 1999; Phillips 1999; 
Beaulieu 2001). If auditors are focused on maintaining audit quality or an acceptable 
level of audit risk, higher securitization risk should induce increased audit effort, 
which will usually result in higher audit fees.3 This allows us to use the established 
methods of audit fee studies to investigate whether auditors respond to differences in 
risks arising from asset securitizations, and whether auditor behavior in this regard 
has varied as a result of the global financial crisis.4 The model we use for this purpose 
                                                
3Alternatively, self-interested auditors who recognize their risk exposure but are constrained from increasing effort 
may price-protect themselves by charging an audit fee premium, also resulting in higher audit fees. 
4The analysis of audit fees is a basic tool in research into the audit market and auditors’ behavior. Extant studies 
extensively investigate cross-sectional determinatio  and inter-temporal variation in audit fees for indications of 
variation in audit effort and fee premia (Simunic 1980, 1984; Palmrose 1986; Ettredge and Greenberg 1990; Pratt 
and Stice 1994; Craswell et al. 1995). However, most such studies specifically exclude financial institutions from 
their analyses because of the attendant accounting and risk differences compared to other sectors. Consequently, 
there is relatively little research on audit effort and pricing in the banking industry. 
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is consistent with that used in Fields et al. (2004) to examine audit fee differences in 
relation to bank characteristics, which we extend to include asset securitization risks 
reflected in the amount of securitized assets and the amount of retained interests 
(Barth et al. 2011). 
This approach is consistent with the view that audit risk in asset securitizations 
associated with transaction complexity, sale or borrowing accounting choice 
flexibility, and the risk of earnings or capital manipulations by management, is 
represented in the amount of securitized assets (Kane 1997; Matsumoto 2002; Minton 
et al. 2004; Karaoglu 2005; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Landsman et al. 2008). 
Significant recourse against the originator of securitized assets is represented in 
retained interests, which is also sensitive to the reliability of fair value estimation 
conditioned on the economic environment (Barth et al. 2011). 
Using publicly available data on U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 
2003 to 2009 (after which time accounting regulations changed with the issuance of 
FAS 166 and FAS 167), we find that audit fees are not i fluenced by asset 
securitization amounts or retained interests prior to the GFC, but audit fees increase 
with retained interests (RI) in the post-GFC period. This suggests that auditors did not 
recognize the risk of asset securitizations prior to the GFC.   
Asset securitizations are economically significant d an important sources of 
audit risk, as revealed by the current financial crisis and bank failures. Therefore, the 
evidence in this study concerning the changed relevance of asset securitizations to 
audit effort is an important contribution to the established literature concerned with 
auditor behavior. The study also contributes to the emerging literature on bank audits, 
which is a growing area of policy interest since Basel (2008) called for “more 
research on bank audits, especially in areas that are of particular interest to bank 
regulators and important to financial markets”.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is 
reviewed in Section 2 and hypotheses are developed in Section 3. Section 4 describes 
the research design and Section 5 reports the main results. Robustness tests and 




2.1 Asset securitizations 
A bank’s asset securitization transaction begins with the bank selling its cash 
flow rights from a pool of financial assets, such as mortgages and loans, to a special 
purpose entity (SPE) which is usually organized as a qualifying special purpose entity 
(QSPE) to avoid consolidation in the bank’s accounts. The loans are then securitized 
by the QSPE in ranked tranches. In the absence of credit enhancements, the most 
junior securities tranche is the first to bear any default losses arising from the 
securitized assets. When the first tranche is exhausted, the losses pass to the second 
junior tranche, and so on until all losses are absorbed. Credit enhancements can 
insulate senior securities from the default risk on the underlying financial assets. 
Enhancements are provided by the originators, or a third-party guarantor, in the form 
of cash collateral accounts, reserve funds, commitmen s to (re)purchase assets in 
default, credit derivatives, or recourse provisions. Rating agencies are involved in this 
step to assign ratings to the tranches. The securitization strategy is usually to 
maximize the size of the most senior tranche while still obtaining a AAA rating, and 
to leave the first (most junior) unrated and as small as possible while still allowing the 
second tranche to obtain an investment grade rating (Ryan 2008). The most junior 
tranche(s) is often retained by the SPE and the invstment-grade tranches are sold to 
investors.5 Proceeds from investors fund the SPE’s purchase of the cash flow rights 
from the bank. The SPE distributes the future cash flows generated by the underlying 
securitized financial assets to the investors, as specified in the security. 
2.2 Accounting choices 
The main accounting choice in relation to the securitization of financial assets is 
whether the initial transfer to the SPE is a sale or borrowing. The disclosure risks 
pertain to transactions treated as sales. From 2003to 2009, the accounting treatment 
was determined under FAS 140 and FAS 156.6 Treating the transaction as a sale 
                                                
5We don’t consider situations where a retained junior tranche(s) is re-securitized to CDO with more complex 
securitization and credit enhancement procedures and sold to investors. This “upgrading” of the junior tranche to 
an investment-grade security has a similar balance she t effect to the simpler model. 
6 For the years 2003 to 2009, accounting for an asset securitization was subject to FAS 140 (or FAS156 after 2006) 
Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities and FIN 46(R) An 
FASB interpretation of ARB 51 relating to consolidation f SPEs. The change in accounting standards from FAS 
140 to FAS 156 has a very limited impact on the sal or borrowing accounting issue. The requirement change of 
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allowed a bank to: (1) remove the securitized assets from its balance sheet; (2) record 
cash proceeds as the amount received and recognize non-cash proceeds at fair value; 
(3) recognize the book value of the retained sub-securities as the proportion of the 
sub-securities’ fair value to the fair value of the securitized assets; (4) recognize the 
retained interests as something other than sub-securiti s (e.g., servicing assets); and 
(5) record the difference between net cash proceeds an  the value of the components 
of assets sold as a gain. Compared with secured borrowing accounting, sale 
accounting and their omission from the bank’s consolidated financial report dress up 
reported leverage, liquidity, earnings, and the capital ratio.7 For a securitization to 
qualify as an asset sale, the transferor must transfer the financial assets to a 
bankruptcy-remote entity and surrender controls of the transferred assets. To avoid 
being included in the bank’s consolidated financial report, the entity must be a QSPE 
satisfying the conditions specified in FIN 46(R) or otherwise independent of the bank. 
If the asset transfer qualifies as a sale, the illiquid loans are written back and the bank 
recognizes any retained interests and servicing assets on its balance sheet; unrealized 
future cash flows are treated as a gains or loss in the current income statement.  
2.3 The economic substance of asset securitizations 
Before the reformation of securitization accounting rules, resulting in FAS 166 
and FAS 167, the general view of asset securitization from standard setters and 
regulators was as a sale with the appropriate transfer of risks  (FAS 140; FIN 46R). 
Although rating agencies state that they treat asset ecuritization as a secured 
borrowing before and after the sub-prime crisis (e.g., S&P Corporate Rating Criteria 
2001, 2008), empirical evidence suggests that, in practice, the rating agencies treated 
asset securitization as an asset sale (Cheng and Neamtiu 2009; Barth et al. 2011). In 
contrast the capital market appears to endow securitization with incomplete transfers 
of control and risk and treat it as a secured borrowing in relation to its risk and value 
relevance (Kane 1997; Ryan 1997; Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and Richardson 2006; 
Shipper and Yohn 2007; Hansel and Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 2008; Landsman et al. 
2008; Barth et al. 2011).  
                                                                                                                                 
fair value measurement to servicing assets in FAS 156 limitedly affects our study as servicing assets are not the 
focus of this study and only represent a small portion of retained interests. Effective from November 2009, FAS 
166 and FAS 167 largely limit the scope of accounting for asset securitization as sales since 2010. 
7As shown in Appendix 1. 
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A fundamental aspect of the extent and nature of risk transfers in banks’ asset 
securitizations is the extent of any explicit or implicit recourse that endowed the bank 
with residual risks in addition to their retained interests. The existence of 
unrecognized implicit risks appears to have been a basic issue in assessing the 
financial exposure of banks that had engaged in securitization. The information 
disclosures during 2003-2009 generally constrained id ntification of recourse risks 
carried by the originating banks. 
It is generally accepted that asset securitizations increase information uncertainty 
and asymmetry (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Chordia et al. 2001; Easley and 
O’Hara 2002; Cheng et al. 2011).8 The financial reporting choices for asset 
securitizations cannot fully describe complex securitization transactions (Schwarcz 
2004; Ryan 2007) and Barth et al. (2003) report thacomplexity and flexibility in 
security structuring and accounting treatments lead to information uncertainty and 
asymmetry. 
3 Hypotheses Development 
It appears that financial markets view asset securitizations, on average, as 
borrowings with the risk retained by the originator, especially under unfavorable 
market conditions (Kane 1997; Ryan 1997; Treacy and Carey 1998; Niu and 
Richardson 2006; Shipper and Yohn 2007; Hansel and Krahnen 2007; Chen et al. 
2008; Landsman et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011). If auditors are sensitive to market 
participants’ attitudes towards asset securitizations, their audit risk assessment will 
emphasize the clients’ levels of asset securitization, especially under unfavorable 
situations. We develop hypotheses that relate auditor r sk to each of total asset 
securitizations and retained interests, and how the relations might vary with changing 
market conditions. 
The purpose of an audit is to reduce information risk by providing assurance that 
an entity’s financial report is free from material omissions or misstatements. We 
assume that, in keeping with professional standards, uditors seek to reduce audit risk 
                                                
8Before the sub-prime crisis, it was argued that securitization could reduce information uncertainty. The grounds 
for this included: (1) securitization requires disclo ure of more information than non-securitized assets (Foley et al. 
1999; Schwarcz 2004); The increased transparency with regard to the underlying loans mitigates information 
asymmetry; (2) rating agencies published ratings on securities periodically and provide 3rd party monit ring on 
securitized assets; and (3) the underlying assets ar  ubject to stricter disclosure requirements under securitization 
(Foley et al. 1999). 
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to an acceptable level when planning and conducting an audit. Based on the standard 
audit risk models, which identify audit risk as a product of the client’s inherent risk 
and control risk and the auditor’s detection risk, higher identified inherent risk or 
control risk leads the auditor to reduce detection risk by allocating more audit 
resources (expending more effort) to the higher risk areas of the engagement to 
achieve an acceptable level of estimated audit risk (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Pratt and 
Stice 1994; Lyon and Maher 2005; Hay et al. 2006).While there is no ex ante reason 
to suggest weaknesses in banks’ controls vary systematically with the extent and 
characteristics of asset securitizations by the bank, we expect asset securitizations to 
increase the auditors’ assessments of inherent risk for at least three reasons: 
1. An asset securitization involves complex transaction procedures between multiple 
parties (such as the client bank, one or more SPEs, a guarantor, a rating agency 
and investors), which involve complex legal documents. The involvement of 
multiple parties and reliance on complex documents increases inherent risk. 
2. Accounting for a securitization as a sale and externalization of the SPE and its 
subsequent transactions may veil the economic substance of the transaction to the 
bank and financial risk status of the bank. 
3. Securitization transactions may arise from motives for earnings management 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999; Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2002) and capital 
management (Moyer 1990; Karaoglu 2005). Bank management may exploit the 
information veil to use securitizations for manipulation purposes (Karaoglu 2005; 
Ambrose et al. 2005; Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009).  
3.1 The level of securitized assets and audit fees 
The general expectation of increased inherent risk a sessments leading to 
increased auditor effort is consistent with the extant auditing literature. There is 
substantial evidence in prior studies that client complexity, crudely proxied by 
measures based on organizational structure, asset struc ure and industry diversity, is 
positively associated with audit effort or fees (Hay et al. 2006). Evidence of the 
positive impact of the risk of earnings management or aggressive financial reporting 
on audit planning and pricing is reported in experim ntal studies (Houston et al. 1999; 
Phillips 1999; Beaulieu 2001) and archival research (Gul et al. 2003; Bedard and 
Johnstone 2004; Lyon and Maher 2005).  
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Given the transactional complexity of securitizations, the extent of the 
accounting discretion available during our study period, and the incentives for banks 
to maintain financial performance and capital levels, we argue that auditors will 
initially assess inherent risk as high, and then will have to examine aspects of a bank’s 
asset securitizations to establish the appropriateness of accounting treatments 
irrespective of risks attached to retained interests. This implies that audit effort will 
vary in relation to clients’ levels of asset securitization, holding other factors constant. 
The amount of securitized assets attributable to a bank may also indicate the potential 
for implicit recourse. Empirical and practical evidence suggest that originators 
sometimes provide implicit recourse to the investors (Higgins and Mason 2004; 
Calomiris and Mason 2004). Implicit recourse is fairly common in asset 
securitization; e.g., Higgins and Mason (2004) repot 17 recourse events involving 10 
credit card banks from 1987 to 2001 and find that only 2 credit card securitizations 
that entered early amortization did not provide recourse support to the securitized 
assets. There were many instances of voluntary credit support from originators by 
repurchasing assets or extending credit to the SPEs during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009.9 This potential, combined with the extent to which the amount of securitized 
assets may indicate undisclosed credit enhancements, or mis-described transactions, 
increases inherent risk, and thus the potential for a positive association between the 
amount of securitized assets and auditor effort. Therefore, we hypothesize a positive 
relation between the level of asset securitization by a bank and auditor effort as 
measured by audit fees: 
 
H1: Audit fees are positively associated with the amount of securitized assets. 
 
3.2 Retained interests and audit fees 
Irrespective of the interpretation of an asset securitization as a sale or borrowing, 
we expect an auditor to consider the client’s retained interests in securitized assets 
when evaluating the inherent risks associated with asset securitizations. The retained 
                                                
9In December 2007, Citigroup brought back onto its balance sheet $49 billion of SPE assets that it had previously 
securitized. The same assets were valued at $87 billion in August 2007 and Citicorp’s total retained interests in all 
securitizations were only $25.8 billion at December 31, 2006, indicating substantial losses to Citicorp in this 




interests represent the components that bear the first risk of losses on the securitized 
asset, which are designed to be sufficient enough to cover reasonably expected credit 
risks attached to the underlying assets. If auditors accept that an asset securitization is 
a sale of assets, their audit risk consideration in relation to asset securitization is 
restricted to the components of retained interests. If auditors form the view that a 
securitization has the characteristics of borrowing, I  this case, a positive association 
between audit fees and total securitized assets rather than audit fees and retained 
interests is expected. Therefore, we make a directional prediction on the association 
between audit fees and retained interests:  
 
H2: Audit fees are positively associated with the amount of retained interests. 
 
Two other issues may also affect auditors’ risk asses ment of the information 
provided by retained interests. First, the value of retained interests is based on the fair 
value estimate of the securitization components (FAS 140; FAS 157). Due to the lack 
of a market consensus price, the fair value estimate of the components usually relies 
on certain subjective assumptions of default rates, prepayment rates and discount rates 
(FAS 157). Therefore, the reliability of fair value estimation is sensitive to the 
economic environment and is also subject to management anipulation (Dechow et 
al. 2009). Second, empirical research finds evidence on the existence of implicit 
recourse to subsidize SPE investors for any default losses related to the transferred 
assets (Higgins and Mason 2004; Calomiris and Mason 2004; Chen et al. 2008; 
Gorton and Souleles 2005). It implies that the actul guarantee provided by the 
originator is not limited to the extent of retained interests, but covers the overall credit 
risk of the underlying assets limited to the total amount of securitized assets in case of 
economic difficulties. If this is the case, although retained interests represent the 
explicit recourse of originators to investors, due to their subjective fair value estimates 
and the existence of implicit recourse, the retained interests should be no more 
important than other components in judging the true risk association between the 
originator and the securitized assets for auditors.  
3.3 Auditor behavior with the global financial crisis 
Following the downturn in the U.S. property market in 2006, the already 
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escalating rate of mortgage defaults rapidly accelerated. This further spurred the 
burgeoning credit crisis, increasing the general level of debt defaults, squeezing the 
earnings of financial sector businesses, and reducing confidence in many banks. The 
fall in earnings, emergent fragility of sub-prime dbt instruments and increasing 
liquidity issues caused a deposit exodus from affected banks that lead to prominent 
failures; these, with the accompanying demise of non-depository banks and other 
financial entities crucial to the shadow banking system, had substantial widespread 
flow-on effects that rolled into the global financial crisis. Bankruptcy statistics reflect 
this pattern. In the calendar years 2003-2007, U.S.business bankruptcy filings totaled 
35,037, 34,317, 39,201, 37,333 and 25,925 respectively. These escalated in 2008-
2010, with annual totals of 38,651, 58,721 and 56,282.10 Banks and their auditors 
would have been sensitive to lead indicators of bankruptcy, which we suggest would 
have heighted auditor sensitivity to the increased systemic risk from 2007 onwards. 
Asset securitizations have been identified as significant contributors to the 
financial crisis. We investigate if auditors’ response to asset securitization factors 
changed after the onset of the GFC. For an auditor, constraints on the availability of 
capital and credit, going concern and liquidity issue , the discretion and complexity in 
SPEs and other complex financing arrangements, and significant estimation and 
valuation uncertainty in a deteriorating market contribute to the auditor’s appraisal of 
audit risk for a client in the financial market. Irrespective of their behavior in relation 
to asset securitizations prior to the downturn, we expect that auditors would pay more 
attention to asset securitization risks from 2007, resulting in a stronger relationship 
audit fees and asset securitization, compared to before the GFC: 
 
H3a: There is a stronger positive association between audit fees and securitized   
assets after the onset of the GFC compared to before the GFC. 
H3b: There is a stronger positive association between audit fees and retained interests 
after the onset of the GFC compared to before the GFC. 
 
Asset securitization risks could be represented by the amount of securitized 
assets or by the amount of the retained interests, depending on auditors’ analysis of 
                                                
10Calendar year bankruptcy statistics obtained from www.uscourts.gov/statistics accessed June 2, 2011. A similar 
pattern is observed for non-business bankruptcy filings, which went from 597,965 in 2006 to 1,536,799 in 2010. 
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the economic substance of the asset securitizations.  
3.4 The impact of asset securitizations on audit pricing to credit risks 
Fields et al. (2004) suggest a positive association between audit fees and bank 
credit risks. Specifically, banks with higher level of commercial loans, mortgage loans 
and intangible assets are charged higher audit fees by auditors; banks with higher 
levels of problematic assets (proxied by the non-performing loan ratio and the charge-
off ratio) are charged higher audit fees by auditors.  
Asset securitizations have the potential effect of understating observable credit 
risks by removing on-balance sheet financial assets from the balance sheet. We argue 
that the awareness of the risks embedded in asset securitizations should raise auditors’ 
concerns about auditees’ on-balance sheet credit risks and result in more audit effort 
on credit risk evaluation and assurance, leading to higher audit fees. 
 
H4a: As securitized assets increase, audit fees increase relative to credit risks.  
H4b: As retained interests increase, audit fees increase relative to credit risks.  
 
We measure the credit risks with asset structure proxies (commercial loan ratio, 
mortgage loan ratio) and problematic asset proxies (the non-performing loan ratio and 
the charge-off ratio). Asset securitization risks could be represented by the amount of 
securitized assets or by the amount of the retained i t rests, depending on auditors’ 
understanding of the economic substance and/or the extent of risk transfer of asset 
securitizations.  
4 Research Design 
4.1 Model 
We test the hypotheses by using an adaptation of the audit fee model for financial 






















LNAF = the natural logarithm of audit fee; 
 
LNTA = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
BIGN = 1 when the incumbent auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; 
STDRET = the corresponding one-year standard deviation of daily stock 
returns; 
LOSS =  1 when the BHC reports a loss, 0 otherwise; 
CAPRATIO = risk-adjusted capital ratio, defined as total amount of bank 
regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets; 
TRANSACCT = transaction accounts, including non-interest-earning demand 
deposit accounts (DDAs), interest-bearing checking accounts 
in NOW accounts, automatic transfer from savings (ATS) 
accounts, and Money Market deposit accounts (MMDAs), 
divided by total deposit; 
SECURITIES = investment security assets, including held-to-maturity and 
available-for-sale securities, divided by total asset ; 
COMMLOAN = the proportion of commercial loans to gross loans. 
Commercial loans involve commercial and industrial loans, 
loans to depository institutions, acceptances issued by other 
banks, and agricultural loans; 
MTGLOAN = mortgage loans/gross loans; 
INTANG = intangible assets/total assets; 
CHGOFF = net charge-offs/allowance for loan and lease losses; 
NONPERFORM = non-performing loans/gross loans. Non-performance loans are 
defined as past due 90 days or more and nonaccrual loans, 
leases and other assets; 
INEFFICIENCY = the management efficiency ratio, defined as the ratio of total 
operating expense (including total interest and non-i terest 
expenses) to total revenue (including total interest and non-
interest revenues); 
SENSITIVE* ∆INT = on-balance-sheet interest rate risk measure, defined as (interest 
rate-sensitive assets - interest rate-sensitive liabilit es)/total 
assets, all multiplied by interest rate change in the current 
year; 
INTDERIV = the notional amount of interest rate derivatives divided by 
total assets; 
SAVING = 1 when the BHC is a savings institution, 0 otherwise;  
 
Fields et al. (2004) use SENSITIVE, the net interest-s nsitive assets divided by 
total assets, to measure the bank’s interest sensitivity. SENSITIVE is not a significant 
variable in the Fields et al. bank sample or our 2003-2009 BHC sample. We argue that 
the importance of interest-sensitivity should be linked with the magnitude and the 
direction of interest rate changes. Therefore, we add two variables to or model: 
SENSITIVE*∆INT and INTDERIV. SENSITIVE*∆INT modifies SENSITIVE by 
multiplying the annual changes in the market yield on U.S. treasury securities at one-
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year constant maturity, quoted on investment basis. INTDERIV is the notional amount 
of a bank’s interest rate derivatives divided by total assets, which we argue will 
capture off-balance-sheet interest rate risks.11 The effect of interest rate derivatives on 
audit effort is two-fold. First, the interest rate risk from on-balance-sheet assets and 
liabilities could be hedged by off-balance-sheet interest rate derivatives, leading to 
reduced business risk and reduced audit fees. On the o er hand, interest rate 
derivatives can be used for speculative purposes, hence exaggerating interest rate risk 
and increasing audit fees. In addition, the complexity of derivatives leads to increased 
audit fees. 
Test Variables: 
SARATIO = total outstanding securitized assets, deflated by total assets 
(Barth et al. 2011); and 
RIRATIO = total retained interests, including retained interest only strips, 
retained credit enhancements, and unused commitments to 
provide liquidity (service advances), deflated by total assets 
(Barth et al. 2011); 
GOSRATIO = relative gains on securitization, calculated as the n t 
securitization income divided by net income;  
PGFC = 1 for the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, and 0 otherwis. 
 
The test variables SARATIO and RIRATIO represent asset securitization risk 
factors as identified in Barth et al. (2011). SARATIO and RIRATIO measure the 
misstatement risk associated with asset securitizations based on the borrowing/sale 
accounting assumption. If auditors view a particular b nk’s asset securitizations as 
sales (borrowings), the misstatement risk pertains to the retained interest amount (total 
securitized asset amount). These measures also relate to the bank’s overall credit risk 
and the misstatement risk in auditors’ going concer reporting. We include 
GOSRATIO to control for the reported earnings misstatement risk arising from 
securitization sales. Prior research demonstrates that manipulating gains on 
securitizations can be an effective tool in earnings management and capital 
management (Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsumoto 2002; Rosenblatt et al. 2005; Dechow 
                                                
11Banks could use interest rate derivatives to hedge on-balance-sheet interest rate risks. Supposing that the only 
purpose that banks use interest rate derivatives is to hedge their on-balance-sheet interest rate risks, a higher 
proportion of interest rate derivatives lead to lower risks and, potentially, lower audit fees. However, the notional 
amount of the derivatives and the amount of the on-balance-sheet position hedged might not be the same. (Under 
the derivative mechanism, the derivative amount is affected by both the amount of the hedged position and the date 
to maturity of the derivative and the hedged positin.) While the relation between INTDERIV and on-balance-




and Shakespeare 2009). 
4.2 Data Source and Criteria 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Karaoglu 2004; Chen et al. 2008; Barth et al. 
2011), we draw bank financial data and asset securitization details from the FRB Y9-
C Regulatory Filing database. Y9-C reports are filed each quarter by BHCs that have 
total assets exceeding $150 million before 2006 and BHCs with total assets exceeding 
$500 million after 2006. The limit of $150 million before 2006 and the increase of the 
reporting threshold to $500 million total assets after 2006 do not affect our results 
because the majority of banks engaging in asset securitizations are over the 
$500million asset threshold throughout our study period.12Securitization information 
is disclosed in Schedule HC-S “Servicing, Securitization and Asset Sale Activities” of 
Y9-C reports, which are included in the reports from the second quarter of 2001 with 
more details of retained interests disclosed after 2003.  
Auditor details are extracted from Audit-Analytics database. One-year standard 
deviations of daily stock returns are calculated from daily stock prices and dividend 
information collected from CRSP database. Interest rate information is obtained from 
U.S. Treasury and FRB official disclosures. The economic condition indicator, NYSE 
Financial Sector Index is collected from the NYSE official website.  
4.3 Sample 
We restrict our sample to BHCs. First, for firms performing securitization 
activities, BHCs represent a relatively large and economically important sample 
(Barth et al. 2011). Niu and Richardson (2006) indicate the intensity of securitization 
related transactions in the traditional financial sector is stronger than in other sectors. 
Dechow et al. (2009) report that BHCs are the primary securitizers of assets. Second, 
as stated in Chen et al. (2008), restricting our sample to BHCs increases the power of 
control for factors other than interested variables, which increases our ability to 
observe the effect of the securitization risks. Furthermore, as the audit fee information 
can only be available for publicly listed companies, we only include publicly listed 
BHCs in our sample. 
We restrict the sampling period from 2003 to 2009 for two reasons. First, the 
                                                
12 See Appendix 2: Supporting Figures. 
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sampling period starts at 2003 as securitization data are only available on Y9C Bank 
Regulatory reports after the second quarter of 2001, and most of the retained interests’ 
information is available after 2003. Second, the application of FAS 166 and FAS 167 
from November 2009 has largely changed the accounting reatment for asset 
securitizations; therefore we end the sampling period at 2009.  
The final sample consists of 2,424 firm-year observations for the period 2003-
2009 on 452 U.S. publicly listed BHCs.13Of our 2,424 firm-year observations, 2,113 
(87%) observations do not report any outstanding securitized assets and 2,228 (92%) 
do not report any retained interests. We divide our sample into 2,113 firm-years for 
384 BHCs that are non-securitizers (SA=0) and 311 firm-years for 68 BHCs that are 
securitizers (SA>0). For the securitizer subsample, there are 196 firm-year 
observations (on 49 BHCs) reporting retained interests. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics14 
Means of variables are presented in Table 1, with means-difference tests for 
securitizers and non-securitizers, and annual pooled m ans. The pooled average audit 
fees are $1.3 million, with a strong upward trend from 2003 to 2009. There are 
significant mean differences between securitizers and non-securitizers for most 
variables. Specifically, on average, securitizers have significantly higher audit fees 
and total assets, are more likely to choose a Big N auditor, have higher capital ratios, 
common loan ratios, mortgage loan ratios and intangible asset ratios. Generally, this is 
consistent with the likelihood of a BHC engaging in securitization increasing with 
BHC size. 
In our sample, the proportion of BHCs audited by Big N auditors steadily 
declines from 57.3% in 2003 to 41.7% in 2009. Simunic and Stein (1987) and Fields 
et al. (2004) discuss the lower ratio of Big-N auditors for bank audits, compared to 
other industries, as that increased litigation riskin the banking industry results in a 
shift from larger to smaller audit firms.15 Ettredge et al. (2009) claim that the decrease 
in Big-N audits in BHCs reflects client migration to small auditors after SOX 404 
became effective. Our unreported analysis indicates that the average audit fees and 
                                                
13 See Appendix 2: Supporting figures for detailed sampling procedures.  
14
 RI reported for J.P. Morgan increased from $8bn in 2008 to $99bn in 2009. We have not found relevant 
information on this sudden change. At this stage, we have exclude JPM 2009 from the analyses.  
15
 Fields et al. (2004) report that Big N auditors audite  more than 70% of BHCs in 2000. 
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total assets values are all much lower in Non-Big N audits than in Big N audits. 
There is a sharp increase in the proportion of BHCs experiencing a loss 
duringthe GFC. Correspondingly, with the consideration hat the asset composition is 
generally stable during the period (e.g. TRANSACCT, OMMLOAN, MTGLOAN 
etc.), asset quality experiences an unfavorable change duringthe GFC, as reflected in 
the deterioration of non-performing loan ratios (NOPERFORM) and the charge-off 
ratios (CHGOFF). On average, securitizers appear to have lower asset quality 
(CHGOFF and NONPERFORM) and have higher on-balance-she t and off-balance-
sheet interest rate sensitivity. 
The sample is highly right-skewed with mean values more than 10 times larger 
than the median values for the pooled data and the yearly data. This distribution is 
common in banking research (e.g., Fields et al. 2004; Karaoglu 2005; Chen et al. 2008 
and Ettredge et al. 2009). Fields et al. (2004) attribute it to several very large BHCs in 
the sample. 
We winsorize all continuous control variables at their 1 and 99 percentiles. 
<Table 1> 
4.5 Correlations 
Table 2 shows Pearson correlations between the regrssion variables. The natural 
logarithm of audit fees (LNAF) is highly correlated with most of the control variables 
except for SECURITIES. The asset securitization measures, namely SARATIO and 
RIRATIO are significantly correlated with each other (r = 0.264, p<0.0001), and both 
are significantly correlated with LNAF (p<0.0001). SARATIO and RIRATIO are also 
correlated with a number of control variables. The positive correlation between asset 
securitization measures and LNTA support the view that asset securitizations are more 
likely to occur in large BHCs. We explain the positive correlation between asset 
securitization measures and Big N auditors as that t e complexity of asset 
securitization transactions forces BHCs to go to Big N audit firms rather than small 
audit firms. The derivative measure INTDERIV is positively correlated with LNAF, 
implying that auditors charge higher audit fees for BHCs with larger proportions of 
interest rate derivative positions. Derivative trans ctions are higher for BHCs with 
larger size and Big N clients. Derivative positions are lower for BHCs with higher 
market volatility, higher proportion of investment securities, and higher proportion of 
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mortgage loans. In addition, SARATIO and RIRATIO are both positively correlated 
with INTDERIV. The differences in the structures of securitizers and non-securitizers 
are also reflected in the correlation table. 
<Table 2> 
5 Results 
We report the regression results for pooled data based on clustered standard 
errors (clustered on BHCs) and control the year effects.  
5.1 The Validity of Modified BHC Audit Fee Model 
As a reliability test, we first estimate the Fields et al. (2004) model, which does 
not consider securitizations, using our pooled sample. As reported in Table 3, LNTA, 
BIGN, SECURITIES, INEFFICIENCY, NONPERFORM, CAPRATIO and 
INTANGIBLE are significant and have the same signs as reported in Fields et al. 
(2004) for cross-sectional data for the year 2000 data. (Note that SECURITIES is 
defined as 1 minus investment securities/total assets in Fields et al. (2004) but defined 
as investment securities/total assets in this study, so our seemingly opposite signs are 
consistent). The signs we obtain for STDRET and MTGLOAN are opposite to those 
in Fields et al. (2004). However, in the modified model discussed next, STDRET is 
not significant in our first year (2003) and negative thereafter. 
The Fields et al. (2004) variable, SENSITIVE, the net interest sensitive assets 
divided by total assets, is not significant in Fields et al. (2004) nor for our sample. In 
Model 1, we drop SENSITIVE and add SENSITIVE*∆INT and INTDERIV. We 
estimate this model for the pooled sample and for each year. As reported in Table 3, 
this improves model fit. INTDERIV is significant and positive for the pooled sample 
(p<0.01) and for each year. SENSITIVE*∆INT is significant (and negative) only in 
2007.16 The yearly regressions for the modified model yield stable and consistent 
results on LNTA, BIGN, EFFICIENCY, and INTDERIV. 
We apply Chow tests to signal the structural changes of the audit fee model 
before and after the onset of the GFC. With post-GFC indicator as the breaking point, 
both the Fields et al. (2004) and the modified audit fee models exhibit significant 
changes. 
                                                




5.2 Audit Fees and Asset Securitizations 
To test H1 and H2, we add SARATIO and RIRATIO with the control variable 
GOSRATIO to our modified Model 1. To test H3, we then, add the time-period 
indicator PGFC and the interaction terms SARATIO*PGFC and RIRATIO*PGFC 
into the model. The results are reported in Table 4. For efficiency, we report the 
coefficients for the new variables only.17 
The results do not support H1. SARATIO is significant only in 2007 and 2009, 
when it is negative. H2 is supported, with RIRATIO positive and significant. 
RIRATIO is significant only in 2003 and in the later years of GFC. The interaction 
term in the pooled result, RIRATIO*PGFC is significant and positive, consistent with 
H3b. 
SARATIO and RIRATIO are significantly correlated (see Table 3).Therefore, we 
also estimate the model for the pooled sample with only one of SARATIO, RIRATIO, 
SARATIO*PGFC or RIRATIO*PGFC (Table 4 Panel B). Both SARATIO and 
RIRATIO are positively significant, indicating some substitution effect. However, 
SARATIO*PGFC remains negative while RIRATIO*PGFC remains positive. 
<Table 4> 
5.3 The Impact of Asset Securitizations on Audit Fees relative to Credit Risks 
We report the effects of asset securitizations on audit fees, relative to credit risk 
factors, in Table 5. We use the ratio of commercial loans (COMMLOAN) and 
mortgage loans (MTGLOAN) to proxy for the credit risks pertaining to asset structure 
and the non-performing loan ratio (NONPERFORM) and charge-off ratio (CHGOFF) 
as proxies for credit risks pertaining to asset quality. These are interacted with our 
securitization variables SARATIO and RIRATIO, and the period indicator PGFC. 
There is some indication that asset securitizations affect the association between 
the asset structure measures and audit fees. The interactions of asset structural credit 
risk measures with PGFC suggest that auditors margin lly increase their audit fees in 
response to commercial loans and mortgage assets when the BHC shows a higher 
proportion of retained interests. Controlling for CHGOFF results in a positive 
                                                
17
 Our other new variable, INTDERIV, remains significant and positive when we add the asset securitization 
factors, a GFC dummy variable, and changes in the financial index to the model. 
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coefficient for SARATIO, indicating further analysis is needed. 
<Table 5> 
6 Robustness Tests 
6.1 Matched Pair Sample and Securitizer Only Sample 
Table 6 Panel A reports the matched pair sample results and securitizer 
subsample results, which are in response to the suspicion that securitizers are 
structurally different from non-securitizers. Securitizers have much higher audit fees 
(LNAF) and larger BHC size (LNTA), a higher proporti n is audited by Big N 
auditors (Big N) and they have lower stock price volatility (STDRET), a higher level 
of loan-charge-off (CHGOFF), and a higher level of intangible assets (INTANG). 
Securitizers are more involved in on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet interest rate 
risks (SENSITIVE*∆INT and INTDERIV). Not surprising is the fact that the 
securitizer subsample is more actively involved in asset securitization transactions 
than the full BHC sample. The matched pair sample consists of 280 BHCs in the 
control group without asset securitization activities and 280 BHCs in the study group 
with asset securitization activities from 2003 to 2009. The matching procedure is: (1) 
for each case, control cases are matched on LNTA (the BHC size measure) and Year 
(the year measure); and (2) if more than one control case matches the study case, one 
control case is randomly selected.  
The securitizer subsample has 311 BHC-year observations (310 observations are 
tested with JPM 2009 excluded at this stage). As shown in Table 6, the results on the 
matched pair sample and the securitizer-only subsample are quantitatively consistent 
to the results in the main analysis. Although asset securitization factors are not 
associated with LNAF for the study period from 2003 through 2009, the interaction 
term RIRATIO*PGFC is positive and significant, indicating that audit pricing 
associated with retained interests increased after the GFC. Similar to the main test 
results, the negative association between SARATIO and LNAF in the during-GFC 




6.2 CAMELS Audit Fee Model Results 
We have concern that Model (1) is over-modeled with 16 control variables. In 
response, we establish Model (2) with reduced numbers of ratio variables from the 
CAMELS framework. In this model, BHC size, auditor choice, and market volatility 
are still controlled. BHC characteristics are contrlled with CAMELS proxies. 
Particularly, capital risk (C) is controlled by CAPRATIO; asset quality (A) and 
earnings capacity (E) are jointly controlled by NONPERFORM and CHGOFF; 
management efficiency (M) is controlled by INEFFICIENCY, liquidity risk (L) is 
controlled by the ratio of securities assets as securities assets are the primary liquidity 
source for banks. The sensitivity to market risk is controlled by SENS*∆INT and 
INTDERIV. The CAMELS model results (Table 6 Panel B) are generally consistent 













6.3 Controlling for Changes in Macroeconomic Conditions, Auditor change and 
Auditor Independence, Investment in MBS and ABS 
We want to clarify if the audit fee determination changes with the macro-
economic conditions other than the GFC. Therefore, w  control for changes in the 
NYSE financial sector index as a measure of the macro-e onomic condition of the 
banking industry (DFININDEX). The NYSE Financial Index increased from 5148 in 
2003 to a peak of 10745 in 2007. Afterwards, the NYSE Financial Index decreased to 
9395 in 2008 and 4667 in 2009. 18 Accordingly, the annual changes of NYSE 
Financial Index are positive for the pre-GFC years from 2003 to 2006, but negative 
for the GFC periods 2007 and 2008. 
Inclusion of Year 2006 as a pre-GFC year might not be appropriate as this year 
may have seen some signals of banking distress and financial crisis and auditors may 
have been affected by them in audit pricing accordingly. There is also an argument 
about using Year 2007 as the starting point for the GFC as major influences of the 
                                                
18 For simplicity, we use the financial index of the first business day in the year to represent the year’s financial 




financial crisis were reflected in the economy from 2008. Therefore, we exclude the 
years 2006 and 2007 respectively from the pooled sample and rerun the regressions.  
The addition of an auditor change indicator or auditor ndependence measure 
into the regression does not affect the main test results. Specifically, 
AUDITORCHANGE is not a significant factor for BHC audit fee determination, both 
before and during the GFC. The auditor independence measure, LNNAF, is positively 
associated with LNAF, indicating that non-audit service fees are increasing with the 
increase of audit fees. In accordance with Hay et al. (2006), we explain the positive 
association between LNNAF and LNAF as non-audit servic s may lead to extensive 
changes in BHCs and, therefore, require additional audit effort and result in higher 
audit fees.  
In response to the argument that BHC’s investment in mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and asset-backed securities (ABS) would be more important for 
auditors than its own securitization activities, weadd the BHC’s investment in MBS 
and ABS securities into the regression. Untabulated results indicate that for the pooled 
period, auditors do not price the bank’s investment in MBS and ABS securities. For 
the period during the GFC, auditors start to increase udit pricing on the bank’s MBS 
and ABS investment.  
Except for the individual effect of above controls on audit fees, untabulated 
results indicate that further controlling on macroeonomic conditions, excluding the 
year 2006 or 2007, controlling for auditor change and auditor independence, and 
including investment in MBS and ABS into the regression do not affect the main test 
results.  
7 Additional Analyses 
7.1 Big N Auditors and Industry Specialists 
The main tests suggest that auditor type is an important factor affecting audit 
fees. Untabulated descriptive statistics indicate that audit fees and total asset values 
are much higher for Big N clients than for Non-Big N clients. Big N clients also have 
higher securitization amounts. Comparing the financial risk factors, Big N clients are 
less likely to report a loss (LOSS) and have lower market risk (STDRET), implying 
that Big N clients are usually less risky. We test whether the association between audit 
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fees and asset securitization factors are different b tween Big N auditors and non-Big 
N auditors. Table 7 Panel A indicates that Big N and non-Big N auditors both increase 
audit fees after the GFC; but only Big N auditors increase their audit pricing to asset 
securitization risks after the GFC (RIRATIO*PGFC: β =5.67, p<0.10). In contrast, 
non-big N auditors decrease audit pricing to both SARATIO and RIRATIO after 2007. 
The results can be cautiously interpreted as Big N auditors probably have better 
awareness of asset securitization risks, even though the results might have been 
distorted by the cluster of asset securitization activities in Big N clients. 
An alternative explanation of the Big N audit fee premiums on asset 
securitizations is the better audit quality of industry specialists. Panel B identifies the 
names of auditors with the number of audits during the period, average total assets per 
client, and total assets audited. PWC has the highest average total assets per clients 
($141,279 million), indicating that PWC dominates the large BHC market. KPMG has 
the largest number of audits (N=543) and the second largest average total assets per 
client ($44,661 million). The other two Big 4 auditors, Ernst & Young and Deloitte & 
Touché also have much larger BHC client base than no -Big 4 auditors. We 
distinguish PWC and KPMG as industry specialists from the other two big N auditors. 
The results suggest that PWC and KPMG do not charge hi her audit fees than the 
other two Big N auditors. Due to serious multicollinearity, it is hard to interpret the 
difference of individual Big 4 auditors’ pricing toasset securitization factors.  
<Table 7> 
7.2 Large BHCs 
We are particularly interested in the large BHCs as as et securitizations are 
clustered in large BHCs. Large BHCs have higher audit fees and more asset 
securitization activities, are more likely to employ Big N auditors, incur a loss, and 
have a higher charge-off rate, a higher intangible asset ratio and a higher interest-
sensitive asset ratio than small BHCs. Dividing thepooled sample into small BHC 
and large BHC subsamples from the median total assets, Table 8 Panel A suggests that 
the main test results are consistent for large BHCs but not for the small BHC 
subsample. By differentiating the top 500 largest BHCs from other BHCs in Panel B, 
the top 500 largest BHC subsample reports consistent results as the main tests, while 
the results on other BHCs are insignificant. Overall results in Table 8 suggest that the 
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main test results are driven by large BHCs.  
<Table 8> 
7.3 BHCs related to Failed Banks 
We are interested in whether auditors’ pricing to asset securitization risks are 
influenced by relevant bank failure for two reasons. First, survivorship bias is an 
important issue to be addressed especially for BHCs from 2003 to 2009 when there is 
an increasing number of bank failures after 2008. Second, it is particularly interesting 
that if the auditors could differentiate those BHCs related to subsequently failed banks 
in audit pricing.  
Table 9 addresses the BHCs related to subsequent bank failures in their 
subsidiaries or themselves.19 In 2,113 non-securitizer observations, 136 BHC-year 
observations (6.44%) are related to bank failures in their subsidiaries or themselves; 
in 311 securitizer observations, 21 observations (6.75%) are related to bank failures. It 
is noted that BHCs related to bank failures are higher in LOSS, CHGOFF, 
NONPERFORM, MTGLOAN and on-balance-sheet interest rate sensitivity, and 
lower in CAPRATIO and INTDERIV. It is also interesting that survivor BHCs have a 
negative mean GOSRATIO while failed BHCs have a positive mean GOSRATIO. The 
regression results indicate that BHCs related with subsequent bank failures are 
charged higher audit fees. In addition, the audit pricing to securitization factors are 
different for survivor BHCs and failed BHCs. While the survivor BHC subsample 
reports consistent results as the main tests, the failed BHC subsample’s results are not 
clear, probably due to the small sample size.  
<Table 9> 
8 Discussion and Conclusions 
At this stage, our study presents a cross-sectional a d inter-temporal picture on 
the association between audit fees and asset securitization risks. No prior study has 
focused on auditors’ responses to the risks associated with asset securitization. The 
main tests and additional analyses are generally consistent on the association between 
audit fees and asset securitization factors in several dimensions. Retained interests are 
                                                
19Most of the bank failures reported by FDIC are not BHCs, but are the subsidiaries of BHCs. 
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significantly associated with audit fees, and this po itive association strengthens for 
the GFC period. On the other side, although the main tests and subsequent robustness 
tests and additional tests give us fairly consistent r sults, our results are, thus far, 
inconclusive. The relevance of total securitized assets is still unclear.  
Our results address the question that “where were the auditors in asset 
securitizations” under the lens of audit pricing. It suggests that auditors focused on the 
risks associated with the retained portion of the securitized assets in their audits, 
rather than securitization levels, especially during the GFC. This is consistent with 
auditors treating asset securitizations as sales, even though bank failures during the 
GFC demonstrate that it might be wiser to treat them as secured borrowings.  
We also find that off-balance-sheet risks audit effort, as reflected in audit fees; 
and the macroeconomic condition and non-audit servic  fees are important 
determinants of audit fees. By comparing the audit pricing to asset securitization risks 
for BHCs audited by Big N and non-Big N auditors, we obtain inconclusive signals 
that Big N auditors are better at pricing asset securitization risks than non-Big N 
auditors. 
This study contributes to the limitedly developed bank audit literature. It 
provides insights on auditors’ responses to the financial crisis, particularly with regard 
to asset securitizations. The relatively stable regulatory and accounting standard 
environment during the study period enhances our study as a test of auditor behavior 
in relation to a deteriorating economic environment. By addressing bank audits and 
asset securitizations, we consider several issues identified in Basel (2008) regarding 
consolidation, fair value estimation and disclosure of off-balance-sheet vehicles. 
The limitations of our study include the following. First, due to the data 
availability, our study only covers 4 years pre-GFC data and 3 years of GFC data. 
This might not be sufficient to capture auditors’ learning and responses to 
securitization issues. Second, this study only analyses the cost-side of the association 
between audit pricing and asset securitization. Reporting quality and audit quality in 
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Table 1 Sample Means 
 Pooled Securitizers Non-Securitizers T-test* 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
N 2,424 311 2113  426 411 393 330 302 286 276 
Dependent Variable   
AUDIT_FEE($,000) 1,284.555 6,073.270 579.733 <.0001 682.882 1,046.842 1,204.970 1,445.312 1,510.448 1,658.200 1,854.968 
LNAF 5.815 7.45 5.57 <.0001 5.209 5.656 5.792 6.039 6.080 6.128 6.13 
Test Variables            
SAAMOUNT ($,000) 4,924,832 38,385,1820   2,336,614 2,942,561 3,772,070 5,828,4680 5,548,330 9,552,501 6,954,975 
RIAMOUNT ($,000) 138,9460 1,082,969   73,082 66,691 69,938 106,777x 113,045 126,605 526,06  
GOSAMOUNT ($,000) 41,743 324,833   38,310 46,085 36,132 58,195 56,676 42,2601 12,013 
SARATIO 0.022 0.171   0.039 0.021 0.019 0.024 0.013 0.015 0.015 
RIRATIO 0.001 0.005   0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
GOSRATIO -0.009 -0.07   0.013 0.017 0.010 0.016 0.016 -0.183 0.009 
Control Variables 
  
TOTAL ASSETS ($,000) 26,929,327 169,932,506 5,881,533 <.0001 16,481,346 19,236,247 21,763,429 29,285,707 34,411,522 37,927,819 39,465,912 
LNTA 14.682 16.962 14.346 <.0001 14.347 14.423 14.542 14.878 14.918 14.985 14.976 
BIGN 0.491 0.807 0.445 <.0001 0.573 0.533 0.486 0.488 0.454 0.434 0.417 
STDRET 0.322 0.117 0.352 <.0001 0.337 0.361 0.371 0.280 0.264 0.310 0.297 
LOSS 0.108 0.116 0.107 0.668 0.009 0.024 0.018 0.012 0.060 0.315 0.471 
CAPRATIO 13.592 15.098 13.370 0.011 14.106 13.871 13.577 13.388 12.675 13.311 13.939 
TRANSACCT 0.570 0.580 0.569 0.276 0.595 0.599 0.579 0.552 0.548 0.517 0.576 
SECURITIES 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.981 0.245 0.228 0.207 0.190 0.173 0.173 0.191 
COMMLOAN 0.167 0.179 0.166 0.006 0.175 0.167 0.160 0.166 0.169 0.168 0.164 
MTGLOAN 0.736 0.634 0.751 <.0001 0.715 0.732 0.744 0.737 0.741 0.744 0.749 
INTANG 0.018 0.035 0.015 <.0001 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.022 0.024 0.019 0.016 
CHGOFF 0.135 0.180 0.129 0.003 0.121 0.103 0.087 0.085 0.122 0.222 0.259 
NONPERFORM 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.012 0.029 0.043 
INEFFICIENCY 0.772 0.739 0.776 <.0001 0.726 0.727 0.738 0.766 0.795 0.850 0.855 
SENSITIVE 0.089 0.144 0.081 <.0001 0.086 0.137 0.117 0.079 0.072 0.055 0.049 
SENSITIVE* ∆INT 0.022 -0.002 0.025 0.120 -0.065 0.089 0.203 0.105 -0.030 -0.150 -0.067 
INTDERIV 0.277 1.961 0.029 <.0001 0.258 0.227 0.237 0.301 0.317 0.296 0.347 
SAVING 0.054 0.016 0.059 <.0001 0.070 0.063 0.064 0.045 0.040 0.038 0.040 
 
Environmental data             
Ref. Interest Rate     1.240 1.890 3.620 4.940 4.530 1.830 0.470 
∆INT     -0.760 0.650 1.730 1.320 -0.410 -2.700 -1.360 
NYSE FIN INDEX     5,148.45 6,874.44 7,889.40 8,893.3  10,745.00 9,394.92 4666.74 
DFININDEX     0.335 0.154 0.105 0.202 -0.111 -0.511 0.239 
Note: 
1. Satterthwaite t test is used. This is an alternative to the pooled-variance t test and is used when th assumption that the two populations have equal variances seems unreasonable. It provides a t statistic tha  asymptotically (that is, 





Table 2: Correlations 
Panel A Pooled Sample (Securitizers and Non-securitizers N=2424) 
 LNAF LNTA BIGN STDR LOSS CAPR TRAN SECU COMM MTGL INTA CHGO NONP INEF SENS S* ∆INT INTD SAVI SARA RIRA 
LNTA 0.914 1                       
BIGN 0.584 0.537 1                  
STDRET  -0.606 -0.638 -0.446 1                     
LOSS 0.089 0.030 -0.080 -0.021 1                
CAPRATIO 0.031 -0.018 0.052 0.020 -0.079 1               
TRANSACCT 0.119 0.124 0.209 -0.173 -0.173 0.105 1               
SECURITIES -0.004 0.028 0.189 -0.000 -0.144 0.291 0.116 1             
COMMLOAN 0.182 0.163 0.197 -0.171 -0.060 -0.036 0.280 -0.034 1            
MTGLOAN -0.429 -0.427 -0.339 0.257 0.106 -0.195 -0.234 -0.147 -0.661 1           
INTANG 0.418 0.399 0.240 -0.311 -0.072 0.353 0.177 -0.075 0.035 -0.197 1          
CHGOFF 0.140 0.109 0.010 -0.061 0.265 -0.016 -0.067 -0.079 0.075 -0.088 0.023 1         
NONPERFORM 0.140 0.082 -0.051 0.002 0.569 -0.077 -0.223 -0.107 -0.052 0.084 -0.057 0.296 1        
INEFFICIENCY -0.056 -0.134 -0.178 0.171 0.574 -0.111 -0.224 -0.071 -0.010 0.144 -0.121 0.155 0.361 1        
SENSITIVE 0.196 0.201 0.171 -0.145 -0.066 0.035 0.273 -0.114 0.202 -0.208 0.086 -0.002 -0.089 -0.136 1      
SENSITIVE*∆INT -0.049 -0.067 -0.050 0.025 -0.110 -0.039 -0.018 0.006 -0.049 0.047 0.004 -0.087 -0.115 -0.067 -0.214 1     
INTDERIV 0.367 0.391 0.112 -0.086 -0.014 -0.016 -0.023 -0.075 0.043 -0.173 0.100 0.015 0.048 -0.022 0.039 -0.018 1    
SAVING -0.086 -0.085 -0.040 0.111 -0.012 0.027 -0.023 -0.026 -0.115 0.172 0.052 -0.006 -0.027 0.019 -0.042 0.002 -0.016 1   
SARATIO 0.166 0.169 0.057 -0.056 0.001 0.055 -0.005 -0.038 -0.062 -0.031 0.153 0.003 0.037 -0.024 0.048 -0.020 0.107 0.058 1  
RIRATIO 0.228 0.230 0.120 -0.091 0.039 0.097 -0.066 0.009 -0.035 -0.140 0.117 -0.003 0.083 -0.059 0.036 -0.023 0.142 -0.011 0.264 1 




Panel B Securitizers N=311 
 LNAF LNTA BIGN STDR LOSS CAPR TRAN SECU COMM MTGL INTA CHGO NONP INEF SENS S* ∆INT INTD SAVI SARA RIRA 
LNTA 0.932 1                   
BIGN 0.575 0.581 1                  
STDRET  -0.458 0.526 0.501 1                 
LOSS 0.028 -0.035 -0.078 0.140 1                
CAPRATIO 0.048 -0.099 0.062 -0.031 -0.048 1               
TRANSACCT 0.058 0.106 0.079 -0.121 -0.171 0.226 1              
SECURITIES -0.220 -0.265 -0.010 0.130 -0.106 0.179 -0.166 1             
COMMLOAN 0.188 0.258 0.148 -0.142 -0.058 -0.019 0.244 -0.152 1            
MTGLOAN -0.504 -0.463 -0.339 0.291 0.121 -0.430 -0.083 0.028 -0.356 1           
INTANG 0.292 0.192 0.186 -0.208 -0.115 0.731 0.353 -0.111 0.043 -0.386 1          
CHGOFF 0.102 0.089 -0.042 0.063 0.171 0.024 -0.096 -0.073 0.081 -0.119 -0.008 1         
NONPERFORM 0.139 0.055 -0.096 0.251 0.589 -0.072 -0.268 -0.018 -0.124 0.168 -0.142 0.127 1        
INEFFICIENCY -0.094 -0.171 -0.300 0.228 0.540 -0.096 -0.165 -0.044 -0.119 0.148 -0.133 0.022 0.270 1       
SENSITIVE 0.357 0.404 0.287 -0.258 -0.087 0.204 0.475 -0.229 0.215 -0.305 0.279 0.001 -0.164 -0.178 1      
SENSITIVE*∆INT -0.009 -0.048 -0.039 0.014 -0.234 -0.036 -0.036 0.023 -0.135 0.023 0.024 -0.011 -0.232 -0.061 -0.033 1     
INTDERIV 0.529 0.523 0.145 -0.100 -0.049 -0.059 -0.075 0.218 0.111 -0.228 0.036 -0.013 0.082 0.002 0.040 -0.025 1    
SAVING 0.065 0.068 -0.002 -0.043 -0.046 -0.028 -0.046 -0.099 -0.209 0.182 0.091 -0.045 0.041 -0.036 0.059 0.070 0.013 1   
SARATIO 0.064 0.033 -0.044 0.006 -0.006 0.028 -0.031 -0.111 -0.298 0.094 0.126 -0.041 0.051 -0.004 0.084 -0.033 0.032 0.397 1  
RIRATIO 0.179 0.136 0.165 -0.113 0.105 0.078 -0.187 0.026 -0.197 -0.140 0.050 -0.062 0.182 -0.112 0.026 -0.038 0.062 0.050 0.192 1 
GOSRATIO -0.014 -0.022 -0.016 0.002 -0.017 -0.008 -0.007 -0.014 -0.011 0.066 -0.047 -0.126 0.008 0.012 0.004 0.066 0.037 0.055 0.030 0.003 
Panel C Non-Securitizers N=2113 
 LNAF LNTA BIGN STDR LOSS CAPR TRAN SECU COMM MTGL INTA CHGO NONP INEF SENS S* ∆INT INTD SAVI 
LNTA 0.869 1                 
BIGN 0.564 0.507 1                
STDRET  -0.640 -0.703 -0.411 1                
LOSS 0.115 0.048 -0.086 -0.037 1              
CAPRATIO -0.105 -0.109 0.020 0.098 -0.130 1             
TRANSACCT 0.140 0.141 0.229 -0.181 -0.174 0.051 1            
SECURITIES 0.055 0.110 0.220 -0.014 -0.150 0.472 0.165 1           
COMMLOAN 0.192 0.161 0.197 -0.168 -0.061 -0.070 0.287 -0.022 1          
MTGLOAN -0.317 -0.321 -0.296 0.213 0.110 -0.006 -0.273 -0.019 -0.737 1         
INTANG 0.360 0.367 0.201 -0.314 -0.070 -0.111 0.122 -0.072 0.023 -0.032 1        
CHGOFF 0.131 0.088 -0.001 -0.062 0.281 -0.064 -0.063 -0.080 0.072 -0.063 0.009 1       
NONPERFORM 0.119 0.053 -0.067 -0.008 0.567 -0.126 -0.219 -0.120 -0.049 0.094 -0.066 0.320 1      
INEFFICIENCY -0.004 -0.097 -0.150 0.152 0.582 -0.150 -0.232 -0.074 -0.095 -0.127 -0.103 0.182 0.382 1      
SENSITIVE 0.150 0.150 0.142 -0.119 -0.065 -0.040 0.250 -0.102 0.198 -0.181 0.021 -0.009 -0.089 -0.125 1    
SENSITIVE*∆INT -0.046 -0.063 -0.044 0.020 -0.091 -0.049 -0.014 0.004 -0.040 0.044 0.011 -0.097 -0.096 -0.071 -0.233 1   
INTDERIV 0.378 0.439 0.217 -0.217 0.031 -0.007 -0.001 0.026 0.134 -0.186 0.081 0.074 0.021 -0.015 0.138 -0.038 1  
SAVING -0.083 -0.084 -0.027 0.109 -0.009 0.073 -0.019 -0.021 -0.108 0.167 0.080 0.001 -0.027 0.018 -0.041 0.005 -0.035 1 
 






Table 3 Regression results for the basic model estimated for the pooled sample and years  
 Fields et al. (2004) Pooled By Year 
Variable Sign p-value Fields Model  Model 1 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Intercept + <0.01 -3.96*** -3.07*** -4.83*** -3.05** -2.99*** -2.99*** -1.63** -2.22*** -1.88*** 
LNTA + <0.01 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.59*** 0.53*** 0.54** * 0.55*** 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 
BIGN + <0.01 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.36*** 0.53*** 0.52** * 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.37*** 
STDRET + >0.10 -0.12* -0.21*** 0.02 -0.45*** -0.30**  -0.30*** -0.18** -0.08 -0.21*** 
LOSS + >0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.50** -0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.29** 0.10 0.00 
CAPRATIO + <0.05 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.01 0.03*** -0.01 0.02* 0.03*** 
TRANSACCT + <0.05 0.12 0.15* 0.46** 0.37** 0.22 0.16 -0.15* 0.00 -0.26 
SECURITIES + <0.01 -0.43** -0.30* -0.95*** -0.53** -0.28 -0.23 0.40* 0.13 0.02 
COMMLOAN + <0.01 -0.37* -0.38* -0.28 -0.31 -0.43 -0.37 -0.46 -0.38 -0.43 
MTGLOAN + <0.05 -0.66*** -0.68*** -0.47** -0.50** -0.46** -0.62*** -0.73*** -0.65** -0.90*** 
INTANG + <0.01 2.63*** 2.69*** 4.26*** 4.70*** 3.62*** 1.49 2.14** 0.59 0.75 
CHGOFF + <0.10 0.12** 0.12** 0.34*** 0.27** 0.18 0.18 0.31*** 0.00 0.07 
NONPERFORM + <0.01 5.66*** 5.10*** 7.09*** 5.00* 11.02*** 4.99* -0.66 5.21*** 5.77*** 
INEFFICIENCY + <0.01 0.63*** 0.58*** 1.40*** 1.19*** 1.12*** 0.83** 0.53* 0.15 0.29** 
SENSITIVE - >0.10 0.03         
SENS* ∆INT    0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.06 0.12 -0.71** -0.06 -0.12 
INTDERIV    0.19*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.19***  0.22*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 
SAVING + <0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 -0.15* 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.06 
Y2004   0.43*** 0.44***        
Y2005   0.52*** 0.53***        
Y2006   0.52*** 0.55***        
Y2007   0.50*** 0.54***        
Y2008   0.42*** 0.47***        
Y2009   0.35*** 0.40***        
CHOW TEST   F-Stat F-Stat        
   1.82** 1.85***        
N 277   2424 2424 426 411 393 330 302 286 276 
Adj. R-square  0.877   0.880 0.886 0.848 0.889 0.888 0.885 0.879 0.881 0.912 
F-stat.   849.77 853.60 149.07 206.37 195.60 158.47 137.41 133.33 179.11 
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
The Chow Tests indicate the difference of the model structure before and after GFC with the break point as 2007. 
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Table 4: Audit Effort and Asset Securitizations, for the Pooled Sample, and the Yearly Samples 
Panel A: Adding SARATIO, RIRATIO and GOSRATIO into the regression 
 Pooled 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef. 
SARATIO 0.03 0.175   0.06 0.023 0.00 0.18 0.21 0.00 -0.73** -0.32 -0.78** 
RIRATIO 3.40 0.028   0.98 0.342 7.04* 2.27 4.75 2.21 4.78 7.51* 5.93* 
GOSRATIO 0.01 0.001   0.01 0.013 -0.16 -0.06 -0.26 0.20 0.19 0.00 -0.07 
 PGFC   0.40 <.0001 0.41 <.0001        
SARATIO*PGFC     -0.50 0.011        
RIRATIO*PGFC     6.08 0.029        
Year Effect 
Controlled 
v  v  v  
      
 
CHOW TEST F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value        
 1.49 0.027 1.50 0.029 1.61 0.011        
N 2423      426 411 393 330 302 286 275 
Adj. R-square  0.885  0.885  0.869  0.847 0.889 0.888 0.884 0.879 0.881 0.909 
F-Stat. 746.56  847.48  692.68  125.23 173.03 164.0 132.80 116.35 112.47 144.39 
Panel B: Adding SARATIO or RIRATIO individually int o the regression 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
SARATIO 0.05 0.059 0.06 0.011     
RIRATIO     3.68 0.012 2.28 0.137 
 PGFC   0.41 <.0001   0.41 <.0001 
SARATIO*PGFC   -0.40 0.051     
RIRATIO*PGFC       3.32 0.093 
Year Effect 
Controlled 
v  v  v  v  
         
N 2423    2423    
Adj. R-square  0.885  0.885  0.885  0.885  
F-Stat. 810.77  777.94  811.75  778.90  
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
The Chow Tests indicate the difference of the model structure before and after GFC with the break point as 2007. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 














Table 5: The Impact of Asset Securitization on Audit Pricing Relative to On-Balance-Sheet Credit Risks 
 Asset Structure Asset Quality 
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
SARATIO 0.07 0.007 0.06 0.018 -0.72 0.138 -0.22 0.39  0.03 0.308 -0.00 0.483 0.05 0.062 0.06 0.015 
RIRATIO 1.35 0.368 2.30 0.289 18.12 0.077 -0.70 0.482 3.02 0.169 3.16 0.365 3.62 0.012 2.01 0.162 
GOSRATIO 0.01 0.002 0.00 0.031 0.01 0.003 0.01 0.011 0.01 0.001 0.00 0.040 0.00 0.012 0.00 0.019 
PGFC   0.41 <.0001   0.41 <.0001   0.41 <.0001   0.41 <.0001 
SA*PGFC   -0.51 0.352   0.12 0.466   -0.89 0.001   -0.29 0.172 
RI*PGFC   -53.40 0.059   70.64 0.052   11.66 0.141   4.57 0.067 
SA*COMMLOAN -1.69 0.115 0.22 0.454             
RI*COMMLOAN 21.34 0.218 -10.58 0.381             
SA*COMM*PGFC   0.09 0.495             
RI*COMM*PGFC   364.77 0.043             
SA*MTGLOAN1     0.84 0.122 -0.17 0.420         
RI*MTGLOAN     -20.60 0.126 1.85 0.463         
SA*MTGLOAN*PGFC       -1.19 0.278         
RI*MTGLOAN*PGFC        -103.47 0.064         
SA*NONPERFORM3         0.71 0.444 5.11 0.251     
RI*NONPERFORM         0.44 0.420 -131.10 0.376     
SA*NONP*PGFC           5.74 0.301     
RI*NONP*PGFC           2.07 0.498     
SA*CHGOFF4             -0.64 0.132 0.57 0.319 
RI*CHGOFF             0.89 0.468 -24.80 0.175 
SA*CHGOFF*PGFC               -1.30 0.139 
RI*CHGOFF*PGFC               31.45 0.130 
Year Effect Controlled v  v  v  v  v  v  v  v  
 
 
                
N 2423                
 
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
The Chow Tests indicate the difference of the model structure before and after GFC with the break point as 2007. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 













Table 6 Robustness Analysis 
 


















Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 
















Panel B Model (2) CAMELS Model Results 
 Pooled 
Variable Coef. Coef. 
SARATIO 0.05 0.07*** 
RIRATIO 4.22** 1.62 
GOSRATIO 0.00** 0.00 
 PGFC  0.42*** 
SARATIO*PGFC  -0.43** 
RIRATIO*PGFC  6.43* 
Year Effect Controlled v v 
   
N 2423  
Adj. R-square  0.881 0.882 
 943.33 854.82 
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 














Variable Matched Pair Sample  Securitizer-only Subsample 
 Coef Coef Coef Coef 
SARATIO -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
RIRATIO 1.16 -0.60 0.23 -2.57 
GOSRATIO 0.00 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 
PGFC  0.14***  0.20* 
SARATIO*PGFC  -0.42*  -0.59*** 
RIRATIO*PGFC  6.53*  8.41** 
Year Effect 
Controlled 
  v v 
     
N 560  310  
Adj. R-squared 0.888 0.890 0.926 0.927 
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Table 7 Big N Auditors and Industry Specialists 
Panel A big N auditors and Non-Big N Auditors 
 Non-Big N Auditors Big N Auditors 
Variable Coef Coef Coef Coef 
SA 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.09 
RI 570.07* 621.57** 3.84** 1.08 
GOS -5.68** -6.03** 0.01*** 0.00** 
PGFC  0.36***  0.44*** 
SA*PGFC  -1.74***  -0.41* 
RI*PGFC  -8715.81***  5.67* 
Year Effect 
Controlled v v v v 
     
N 1233  1190  
Adj. R-square 0.698 0.699 0.877 0.877 
Note: For the Non-big N auditor subsample, there are high VIFs on RIRATIO, GOSRATIO and interaction terms.  
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 



















Panel B Industry Specialists 
 Auditor Name Number of Audits Ave. Total Assets per Client ($’000) Total Assets under Audits ($,000) 
1 PWC 176 141,279,463 24,865,185,549 
2 ERNST & YOUNG 293 28,856,149 8,454,851,764 
3 DELOITTE & TOUCHE 179 32,383,040 5,796,564,097 
4 KPMG 543 44,661,307 24,251,089,882 
6 GRANT THRONTON 97 3,041,260 295,002,225 
7 BDO 25 2,336,364 58,409,099 
8 CROWE CHIZEK & COMPANY LLP 154 1,397,032 215,142,851 
9 OTHERS 957 1,400,673 1,340,443,846 
Total  2424  65,276,689,313 
 
Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
PWC 0.07 0.05 0.05    
KPMG    0.01 0.01 0.01 
BIGN 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.43** * 
SARATIO 0.04 0.04 0.06*** 0.03 0.03 0.05* 
RIRATIO 2.78* 0.76 0.16 3.43** 3.71** 1.83 
GOSRATIO 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 
SA*PWC  0.15 0.15    
RI*PWC  2.04 -0.18    
SA*KPMG     0.08 0.17** 
RI*KPMG     -21.05* -33.56*** 
PGFC   0.41***   0.41*** 
SA*PGFC   -0.59***   -0.45* 
RI*PGFC   7.68   4.99* 
SA*PWC*PGFC   1.10    
RI*PWC*PGFC   -4.16    
SA*KPMG*PGFC      -0.37 
RI*KPMG*PGFC      49.66*** 
Year Controlled V V V V V V 
       
N 2423      
Adjusted R2 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 0.885 
Note: For the Non-big N auditor subsample, there are high VIFs on RIRATIO, GOSRATIO and interaction terms.  
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 




















Table 8 Large and Largest BHCs  
 
Panel A Small and Large BHCs as Divided from the Median Total Assets 
 Large BHCs Small BHCs 
Variable Coef Coef Coef Coef 
SA -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.04 
RI 3.66** 0.95 -114.11 468.35** 
GOS 0.01*** 0.01*** 76.52 59.21 
PGFC  0.50***  0.34*** 
SA*PGFC  -0.44**  -16.88*** 
RI*PGFC  5.58*  -667.71*** 
Year Effect v v v v 
     
N 1211  1212  
Adj. R-square 0849 0.849 0.606 0.606 
For the Non-big N auditor subsample, there are highVIFs on RIRATIO, GOSRATIO and interaction terms.  
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 
















1. High standard errors on RIRATIO, GOSRATIO, and RIPGFC for the pooled sample, before-GFC subsample and during-GFC subsample. 
2. For the during-GFC subsample, all the observations have GOSRATIO of zero. 
 
Panel B Top 500 Largest BHCs and other BHCs, by Total Assets 
 
Top 500 Largest 
BHCs 
Other BHCs 
Variable Coef Coef Coef Coef 
SA -0.04 0.04 0.05*** 0.05*** 
RI 2.99 -0.46 6.58 7.31 
GOS 0.01*** 0.01** 0.63* 0.64* 
PGFC  0.40***  0.42*** 
SA*PGFC  -0.52**  -1.14*** 
RI*PGFC  6.97*  -54.04 
Year Effect v v v v 
     
N 499  1924  
Adj. R-square 0.832 0.833  0.752 
JPM 2009 is excluded from this test, which reduces th  number of top500 largest BHCs to 499. 
 
Note: For the Non-big N auditor subsample, there are high VIFs on RIRATIO, GOSRATIO and interaction terms.  
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 




















Table 9 BHCs Related to Failed Banks 
 
 Panel A Distribution of BHCs Related to Failed Banks 
 Number of BHC-year Related to failed banks Total Number of BHC-year Observations 
Securitizers 21 (6.75%) 311 
Non-Securitizers 136 (6.44%) 2113 
Total 157 2424 
 Number of BHCs Related to Failed Banks Total Number of BHCs 
Securitizers 6 (6.90%) 87 
Non-Securitizers 21(5.75%) 365 
Total 27 452 
 
Panel B Comparative Descriptive Statistics 
  Survivors Failed BHCs 
N  2267 157 
Dependent Variable 
LNAF Mean 5.82 5.80 
Control Variables 
LNTA Mean 14.69 14.45 
BIGN Mean 0.49 0.48 
STDRET Mean 0.32 0.32 
LOSS Mean 0.10 0.26 
CAPRATIO Mean 13.47 12.05 
TRANSACCT Mean 0.58 0.44 
SECURITIES Mean 0.21 0.15 
COMMLOAN Mean 0.17 0.11 
MTGLOAN Mean 0.73 0.84 
INTANG Mean 0.02 0.01 
CHGOFF Mean 0.13 0.22 
NONPERFORM Mean 0.01 0.03 
INEFFICIENCY Mean 0.76 0.84 
SENSITIVE* ∆INT Mean 0.02 0.06 
INTDERIV Mean 0.13 0.08 
SAVING Mean 0.05 0.04 
SARATIO Mean 0.02 0.01 
RIRATIO Mean 0.00 0.00 
GOSRATIO Mean -0.01 0.01 
INV_SECU Mean 0.21 0.15 
 
Panel C Regression Results 
     Survivors  Failed  
Variable Coef Coef Coef Coef Coef  Coef  
Failed Bank 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11*     
SA  0.04  0.07** 0.03 0.06** 0.47 -1.51** 
RI  3.66**  1.16 3.38** 0.43 5.05 23.27*** 
GOS  0.01***  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 1.00*** 1.35** * 
PGFC   0.46*** 0.47***  0.44***  0.02 
Failed*PGFC   0.01 0.01     
SA*PGFC    -0.47**  -0.54***  12.16* 
RI*PGFC    6.27**  6.92**  89.53 
Year Controlled v v v v v v v v 
         
N 2423    2266  157  
Adj. R-square 0.884 0.884 0.885 0.885 0.890 0.890 0.803 0.786 
Note: For the Non-big N auditor subsample, there are high VIFs on RIRATIO, GOSRATIO and interaction terms.  
Due to directional predictions, all the results reported in this paper are one tailed.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (One-tailed test). 
























Appendix 1 Accounting Treatments under FAS140, FAS156 and FAS166 
Panel A Accounting treatments under FAS 140, FAS 156 and FAS 166 
Fair Values    
Cash proceeds $ 1,000 
Servicing asset  40 
Interest-only strip 
receivables 
  60 
FAS 140 before Revision FAS 156    FAS 166  
Carrying amounts based on the relative fair values $ Carrying amounts based on the relative fair value $ Net Proceeds $ 
 Fair value 












Loans sold 1000 91% 910 Loans sold 1040 94.55 945.5 Cash proceeds 1000 
Servicing asset 40 3.6 36     servicing assets 40 
Interest-only strip 
receivables 








Total 1100 100 1000 Total  1100 100 1000 Net proceeds 1100 
Gains on sale    
Gains on 
sale 
  Gains on sale   
Net proceeds $ 1000  Net proceeds $ 1040 Net proceeds $ 1100 
Carrying amount 
of loans sold 







carrying amount of 
loan sold 
 1000 
Gains on sale   90  Gains on sale   94.5 Gains on sale  100 
Note: as required in FAS 166 and FAS 167, the concept of QSPE was deleted. In most situations, the SPEfinancial report should be consolidated with the transferor's report. Therefore, there is no effect of sale 








Panel B: Comparison of Sale accounting and Borrowing Accounting 
(1) We assume that Bank A initially has loan assets of $4,000, consisting of half 
of its total assets. As a bank meeting the capital requirements, Its owner's equity 
is $640, 8% of total assets. Its ROI before the securitization is 10% (the example 
case is established based on the statistics from our 2006 BHC data). 
(3) Bank A securitizes 25% of the loans via a QSPE (after FAS 156), qualifying a sale accounting 
according to FAS140 and FAS 156. 
The balance sheet after the securitization 
Cash $1,000 Liabilities $7,360  
Initial Balance Sheet leverage(D/E ratio): 11.5 Loans $3,000   
Other assets $4,000 Liabilities $7,360 servicing asset $40 
Loans $4,000 Owner's equity $640 Interest-only strip  $60 
total assets $8,000 Liabilities & Equity $8,000 Other assets $4,000 equity $740 
(2) Bank A securitizes 25% of the loans via a QSPE (Before FAS 156); the 
transaction is qualified as a sale according to FAS 140. Total assets $8,100 Liabilities & Equity $8,100 
The balance sheet after the securitization leverage: 10 The income statement after securitization 
Cash $1,000 Liabilities $7,360  net income other than securitization $64 
Loans $3,000 Gains on securitization $95 
servicing asset $36 Other comprehensive income $6 
Interest-only strip  $60 $164 
Other assets $4,000 equity $736 (4) The transaction in (2) and (3) are recorded as a secured borrowing. 
Total assets $8,096 Liabilities & Equity $8,096 The balance sheet after the securitization leverage: 13.06 
The income statement after the securitization cash $1,000 liabilities $8,360 
Net income other than securitization $64 loans $3,000   
Gains on securitization $90 securities pledged to creditors  $1,000 
Other comprehensive income $6 other assets $4,000 equity $640 
    $160    total assets $9,000 liabilities & equity $9,000 
     





Appendix 2: Supporting Figures 
 
Figure 1: The Impact of BHC Reporting Threshold (Total assets > $150M before 2006 and >$500M after 2006) 
 
  Pooled Sample 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
No. of Observations 2424 426 411 393 330 302 286 276 
TA<$500M 
N 258 93 75 59 10 8 6 7 
Mean SAAMOUNT $’000 11,027 29,199 981 945 0 0 0 0 
TA>$500M 
N 2166 333 336 334 320 294 280 269 
Mean SAAMOUNT $’000 5,510,132 2,981,027 3,599,163 4,438,226 6,010,608 5,699,305 9,757,197 7,135,959 
Note: all sampled BHCs have total assets larger than $150M.  
 
Figure 2: The Sampling Procedure 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2003-2009 
Step 1: Bank-year end observations from 
Bank Regulatory Database 5764 5754 5745 5709 5669 5537 5434 39612 
Step 2: Delete observations with missing 
values on total asset 2185 2301 2310 986 966 973 1015 10736 
Step 3: Matching with CRSP-BHC link; 
after this step, only listed BHCs are left* 469 440 424 347 322 306 300 2608 
Step 4: Matching with Audit Fee Data 426 411 393 330 302 286 276 2424 
PCT of listed BHCs included in this study 91% 93% 93% 95% 94% 93% 92% 93% 
* There are 297 BHC names with CRSP-link but not in Y9C reports. These BHCs belong to the following two situations: 1) this BHC was merged into other BHC before 2003, so this BHC no longer existed, 
or 2) this BHC changed its name and ID in Stock Exchange before 2003, so this BHC did exist, but existd in another name and ID. 
Note:  
o In the sampling process, we analyze each case when a co trol variable is of a missing value; 




Appendix 3:  Models and Variable Definitions 
 























LNAF = the natural logarithm of audit fee; 
 
Test Variables 
SARATIO = total outstanding securitized assets, deflated by total assets (Barth et al. 2011); and 
RIRATIO = total retained interests, including retained interest only strips, retained credit enhancements, 
and unused commitments to provide liquidity (service advances), deflated by total assets 
(Barth et al. 2011); 
GOSRATIO = the amount of gains on securitization, defined as the net securitization income (loss) deflated 
by net income;  
PGFC           = 1 for years after 2007 (inclusive), 0 otherwise.   
 
Control Variables 
LNTA = the natural logarithm of total assets; 
BIGN = 1 when the incumbent auditor is a Big 4 auditor, 0 otherwise; 
STDRET = the corresponding one-year standard deviation of daily stock returns; 
LOSS =  1 when the BHC reports a loss, 0 otherwise; 
CAPRATIO = risk-adjusted capital ratio, defined as total amount of bank regulatory capital divided by risk-
weighted assets; 
TRANSACCT = transaction accounts, including non-interest-earning demand deposit accounts (DDAs), 
interest-bearing checking accounts in NOW accounts, automatic transfer from savings (ATS) 
accounts, and Money Market deposit accounts (MMDAs), divided by total deposit; 
SECURITIES = investment security assets, including held-to-maturity and available-for-sale securities, 
divided by total assets; 
COMMLOAN = the proportion of commercial loans to gross loans. Commercial loans involve commercial 
and industrial loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances issued by other banks, and 
agricultural loans; 
MTGLOAN = mortgage loans/gross loans; 
INTANG = intangible assets/total assets; 
CHGOFF = net charge-offs/allowance for loan and lease losses; 
NONPERFORM = non-performing loans/gross loans. Non-performance loans are defined as past due 90 days or 
more and nonaccrual loans, leases and other assets; 
INEFFICIENCY = the management efficiency ratio, defined as the ratio of total operating expense (including 
total interest and non-interest expenses) to total revenue (including total interest and non-
interest revenues); 
SENSITIVE* ∆INT = on-balance-sheet interest rate risk measure, defined as (interest rate-sensitive assets - interest 
rate-sensitive liabilities)/total assets, all multiplied by interest rate change in the current year; 
INTDERIV = the notional amount of interest rate derivatives divided by total assets; 
SAVING = 1 when the BHC is a savings institution, 0 otherwise;  
SENSITIVE = (interest rate-sensitive assets - interest rate-sensitive liabilities)/total assets; 
 
Other Information 
Ref. Interest Rate = market yield on U.S. Treasury securities at 1-year constant maturity, quoted on investment 
basis;  
∆INT = interest rate change in the current year, defined as changes in the market yield on U.S. 
Treasury securities at 1-year constant maturity, quoted on investment basis;  
NYSE FIN INDEX   = NYSE financial sector index in the first business day of the current year; market yield on 
U.S.;  
DFININDEX = Changes in NYSE Fin Index of the current year, defined as the difference between NYSE Fin 
Index of the first business day and the index of the last business day of the current year, 
deflated by the first day NYSE Fin Index. 
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